I enclose the following in partial reply to John Clark's "Comments for the List" (October 13, 1998). Further commentary from Bookchin will be posted in the near future.

Janet Biehl

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Two Conferences
In Reply to Clark's "Comments for the List" (October 13, 1998)

In his RA List message as elsewhere, Clark repeats once again his now-incessant claim that Bookchin and I are "sectarian" and "dogmatic." Actually, Bookchin and I are social ecologists, we do not hesitate to say that we are or what we mean by it, and under that name we advance a specific set of ideas, as he has done since 1964. People may agree or disagree with us, but they know where we stand. Clark advances a different position (to the extent that he has one), with which we have serious disagreements, and to which it now pleases him to apply the name "social ecology." To spell out our disagreements is neither "sectarian" nor "dogmatic": it is simply to engage in mutual critique of our positions.

But Clark also claims that we are "dogmatic" and "sectarian" in our political behavior as well. "The Bookchin-Biehl faction," he says in his message, "has sought to exclude divergent opinions from its publications and conferences." In this connection he has mentioned two conferences, one held in Scotland in 1995, one held in Lisbon in 1998. I would like to provide readers with the facts about our involvement with these conferences, as it applies sto Clark, so they may judge for themselves whether his accusation is valid.

The Dunoon (Scotland) ~~Conference~~ Gathering

On August 14-19, 1995, at Castle Toward in Dunoon, Scotland, an "international social ecology network gathering" was held. According to the promotional flyer, this gathering was to include "workshops and lectures" on a variety of topics, including "strengthening the International Social Ecology Network." Actually, despite the formal-sounding name, no formal "international social ecology network" existed at the time; the "network" consisted rather of a group of people in various places who considered themselves social ecologists and maintained informal contact. Nor was participation in the Dunoon gathering limited to social ecologists; "all welcome," read the promotional flyer, and indeed quite a few individuals who were not social ecologists attended.

Unfortunately, no one from the Social Ecology Project in Burlington--including Bookchin and myself--was able to attend the gathering. Since we were not present, our information about the events that took place there comes from letters and reports from those who did attend. As it happens, Clark's account of that gathering is very much at variance with the accounts of others.

Clark maintains in his RA List message that this gathering and its aftermath represent his "excommunication from Bookchin and Biehl's quasi-religious movement." He has criticized the conference more fully in "Description of a Struggle" (pseud. Max Cafard, _Anarchy_ 45, Spring-Summer 1998, pp. 58ff.) There he recounts that at the Dunoon gathering he (referring to himself in the third person, as "C") presented "a detailed critique of some of the Patriarch's [i.e., Bookchin's] most fundamental ideas. What is more, 'C.' brought along a draft of his critique to the Castle of Social Ecology [i.e., the gathering] and read and discussed some excerpts." The critique to which Clark refers, titled "The Politics of Social Ecology: Beyond the Limits of the City," is a very long attack on libertarian municipalism, which is commonly understood as the politics of social ecology.

To anyone with a glancing familiarity with libertarian municipalism, it should be obvious that the views presented in Clark's "Beyond the Limits of the City" bear little resemblance to the politics of social ecology as Bookchin has formulated it. Indeed, the "eco-communitarian" (p. 20) approach that Clark presents in that paper actually constitutes a rejection not only of libertarian municipalism but of more longstanding aspects of the left libertarian tradition as well.

Above all, its criticisms render any notion of direct, face-to-face democracy (which is what libertarian municipalism essentially calls for) impossible. The paper rejects, first, the concept of the citizen--an "image" that, says Clark, "has its limitations." "It seems unwise," he says, "to define any single role as such a 'nuclear unit' or to see any as the privileged form of self-identity. There are other important self-images with profound political implications. A notable example is that of personhood." (p. 3). He thus dispenses with the citizen--the fundamental subject of democracy--and replaces it with the "person"--an indeterminate, overly broad concept, loaded with meanings that have nothing whatever to do with politics in its specificity.

Worse, Clark would replace the local political community—the democratized commune, in confederation--with the "earth community," since "the political significance of our identity as members of the earth community can hardly be overemphasized" (p. 3). It is unclear what the "earth community" actually is--Clark does not tell us--but it certainly amounts to a further negation of the concept of citizenship. Indeed, he wishes us to define "the fundamental source of [our] identity" not as citizens of a community but "as a member of the earth community" (p. 4). But without a concrete subject--the citizen--democracy has no meaning, and the public sphere is dissolved into the personal.

Further, Clark goes on to criticize Bookchin's identification of locus of political self-management of, by, and for the community, in the municipality. Instead of the democratized municipality, Clark prefers "the most intimate personal sphere, whether identified with the affinity group, the familial group, or the community living group," all of which he sees as "most fundamental socially and politically" (pp. 5-6), certainly more fundamental "politically" than the institutions of face-to-face democracy. For Clark, affinity groups and families—even bioregions--have greater political significance than

citizens' assemblies. But such a depoliticized "politics" deprives the word of all its meaning and excludes the possibility of face-to-face democracy in the citizens' assembly.

Clark extinguishes the citizens' assembly altogether by stripping it of one of its main purposes: making decisions. Indeed, the essence of democratic politics, along with rational deliberation, is decision-making by citizens on matters of communal concern. "It would be a mistake to associate democracy with any *form* of decision-making," he writes, including "a popular assembly" (p. 20). But without decision-making, a democratic institution is woefully bereft of purpose. But this does not appear to trouble Clark: for instead of the assembly of a democratized municipality, Clark's "democracy" consists merely of intangibles and personal actions: "The ultimate expression of democracy is the creation of a democratic system of values in a community that is embodied in the lives and social practices of all the people. Every action in every sphere of life is a kind of legislating" (p. 20). Democracy is thus a matter not of institutions but of values, not of decision-making but of personal behavior, not of decision-making but, for all we know, of cooking and cleaning ("every action in every sphere of life").

Astonishingly, as part of his critique of libertarian municipalism, Clark goes on to praise certain features of representative systems as superior to face-to-face democracy. Assemblies, he says, have problems with "competitiveness, egotism, theatrics, demagogy," and the like. But representative systems have the advantage that "elected representatives or delegates can be chastised" for betraying the wishes of the community, while "those who emerge as leaders of a democratic assembly" cannot be, "since they are acting as equal members of a popular democratic body" (p. 13). As if citizens were not accountable to one another for their behavior! On the contrary, their actions are more accountable since they are under the immediate scrutiny of their fellow citizens.

Even more astonishingly, yet in accordance with his praise of representative systems, Clark criticizes Bookchin's antistatism: Bookchin "seems to reject any political proposal for reform of the nation state" (p. 8). This is a remarkable complaint for an ostensible anarchist to make! Bookchin--like anyone who is serious about membership in the anarchist tradition, such as Elisee Reclus--favors the abolition of the nation-state, and he rejects attempts merely to reform it. In another important respect, too, Clark differs from Bookchin--and from Reclus and Kropotkin as well--notably, in his rejection of revolution: "a movement for social transformation," he says, "must emphatically *not* be defined by struggle" (p. 10). This is the statement of a social democrat, not of an anarchist in the Reclus-Kropotkin tradition of anarchism.

In terms of economics as well, Clark distinctly separates himself from the anarcho-communism of Bookchin--and by extension, Reclus and Kropotkin--and instead embraces enterprise and the market. Sounding like a member of the Chamber of Commerce, he expresses sympathy for "owners of small enterprises" who "would have little enthusiasm" (p. 10) for a municipalized economy--or for any form of communism, for that matter. In the future society Clark envisions, "it is possible to imagine a broad spectrum of self-managed enterprises, individual producers and small partnerships that

would enter into a growing cooperative economic sector that would incorporate social ecological values" (p. 16). Then, "after a great many such enterprises [are] created," they may "continu[e] to participate in the larger market" (17). In other words, in Clark's system, the market--and hence, if history is any guide, capitalism--is to be perpetuated.

Clearly the ideas expressed in this document--whose ideas Clark summarized at the Dunoon gathering--are antithetical to libertarian municipalism, the politics of social ecology. But it is also a rejection of revolution and communism, and it significantly distances the author from anarchism.

Bookchin's Response to Clark's Paper

What were the consequences of Clark's presentation at Dunoon? "The Patriarch [i.e., Bookchin] was enraged that such a challenge to his authority would intrude to within the very Castle walls," Clark/Cafard writes in _Anarchy._ Actually, Bookchin did not learn of the content of Clark's presentation until after the gathering was over. During the gathering, says Clark/Cafard, Bookchin "faxed an urgent plea to the Castle, warning of dire consequences if his principles were not staunchly defended." Actually, since Bookchin and others in Burlington were unable to attend the gathering, we faxed several documents representing our views on various topics; Bookchin's was a brief essay called "Theses on Social Ecology in a Period of Reaction" (later published in _Green Perspectives_). This essay makes no mention of Clark and is essentially a defense of a revolutionary libertarian approach.

Sometime after the gathering ended, Bookchin received a copy of Clark's paper and wrote a reply that he titled "Comments on the International Social Ecology Network Gathering and the Deep Social Ecology of John Clark." In this article (later published in _Democracy and Nature,_ vol. 3, no. 3, issue 9, 1997), Bookchin replied to the criticisms in Clark's essay point by substantive point. He also wrote that he had indeed objected to the gathering organizers' decision to "highlight Clark as a major speaker," which served to "legitimate him as a social ecologist--when he had been in the process of shedding social ecology for quite some time"--certainly what we understood as social ecology, which involved face-to-face democracy, antistatism, libertarian communism, and revolution. Clark's presence, Bookchin wrote, would "grossly confuse--and even mislead--people who regard themselves as social ecologists" (p. 155). He might have added that it would also confuse anarchists, advocates of face-to-face democracy, libertarian communists, and social revolutionaries--since Clark separated himself from all of these ideas in his presentation. In any case, the gathering organizers did not agree with Bookchin on this point and admitted Clark--so much for Clark's portrayal of them as brainwashed "Bookchinites."

The Conference Report

In his RA List message Clark complains that "the views [he] expressed" at the gathering were "censor[ed] from the conference report." This report, a summary of the gathering

proceedings written by Mike Small ("Castle Toward International Gathering 1995), appeared in issue no. 2 (Winter 1996) of a newsletter called _Social Ecology Network International._ "The pages of the Bookchinite International," Clark/Cafard wrote in _Anarchy,_ evidently referring to this periodical, "... published a long report on the Gathering in which all the presentations were summarized. All, that is, except for 'C's' illicit critique. In this case, not a single point from the presentation was mentioned."

Actually, the paragraph concerning Clark's presentation is similar in length and detail to the other paragraphs in the report. What did Small write? "John Clark presented an abbreviated version of his criticisms of libertarian or confederal municipalism," he reported. "'Beyond the Limits of the City' raised a number of issues against the ideas of neighbourhood assemblies central to the politics of social ecology. I don't have room here to go into the lengthy arguments at stake, but John Clark's very presence created some considerable debate, with some members of the network feeling that Clark is now 'beyond the limits of social ecology.'" But Small did not stop here: Far from "censoring" the views that Clark expressed at the gathering, he made them available to anyone interested: "The paper, and the response to these criticisms by Murray Bookchin, are available from the editor." Then, lest there be no mistake, he repeated the names of the papers: "'Beyond the Limits of the City' by John Clark and 'Comments on the International Social Ecology Network Gathering and the Deep Social Ecology of John Clark,' by Murray Bookchin (30 pages)." The report made no similar offer about any other presentation at the gathering.

The Draft Statement of Principles

At the Dunoon gathering a committee had been formed to draft a statement of principles of social ecology, for the "network." Clark, along with several others, volunteered to be on this committee. As Clark/Cafard tells it in _Anarchy,_ "two days [were] spent in the drafting of a document entitled 'Principles of the International Social Ecology Network,'" making it "the activity to which the Gathering devoted by far the greatest amount of its time." He calls the statement that emerged "a statement of principles that spurned Bookchinist sectarianism for the sake of a broader, non-dogmatic social ecology." One may argue about "sectarianism" and "dogma," but the statement of principles was ambigous at best about social-ecological principles of face-to-face democracy, antistatism, revolutionism, and libertarian communism.

Actually (according to an account that we received from one of the drafting committee's member), if the gathering devoted a great deal of time to the document, it was because the social ecologists present found themselves hard pressed to defend social ecology, especially libertarian municipalism, against Clark's attempts to strip its basic ideas from the document altogether. According to Takis Fotopoulos, a committee member: "I volunteered to take part in the proceedings of the committee to draft the principles and aims of the International Social Ecology Network. To my astonishment, ... I had to fight for almost every single word in the drafting document--a fact that became obvious by the

extremely long time it took to draft it, which did not leave any time at all to the plenary to discuss it" (T. Fotopoulos to M. Small, Aug. 19, 1995).

Amazingly, according to several people present, this committee to draft principles of social ecology included some members who were not social ecologists at all. This is unfortunate but not surprising, since participation in the gathering ("all welcome") was open to anyone, regardless of their political views. "Not only [did] nobody in the committee [apart from a few] want to include a description of [libertarian municipalism], let alone the name itself" in the statement, Fotopoulos wrote us, "but after long discussions they agreed to include 'participation in local elections' as just one of the strategies and--after my insistence--a 'key' strategy. Furthermore, we had to fight so that things that I considered obvious to any social ecologist should be included (e.g., 'popular assemblies,' a very elementary description of economic democracy in terms of municipalisation and self-reliance, etc.). Even to mention the fact that today's crisis is not just ecological but also social and economic had to be a bargaining matter, and JC [Clark] accepted it, after he insisted on inserting 'in exchange' that we also face a 'crisis of the human spirit.'"

Back in Burlington, when we examined a copy of the statement of principles, our reaction was amazement. It did not emphasize with any sufficiency the social origins of the ecological crisis, and some of its formulations extended a hand to spiritualistic ecologies (for example, the "crisis of the human spirit" formulation). We objected to the statement's failure to mention the need for social revolution--to eliminate capitalism and the nation-state--and to its failure to explicitly affirm libertarian communism. Finally, we objected to its failure to endorse libertarian municipalism--face-to-face democracy--as the politics of social ecology.

Clark/Cafard writes in _Anarchy_ that the gathering "adopted" the statement of principles "by majority vote." This is not what we were told by our correspondents. After the gathering its primary organizer explained the fate of the statement to us this way: "There were two groups formed at different times to draught this statement, specific points of which were voted on at the end of the conference. These points reflected the makeup of the group in Scotland, and, given that some of those present were clearly [not] social ecologists, the validity of any voting would have been dubious. However we could reach no consensus--with some feeling that we should, for example, include reference to a 'crisis of human spirit.' Others felt that any reference to this would have us confused with 'spiritualism,' whilst others felt that it was important to acknowledge the disintegrative impact of the insidious market, alienation, commodification, reification, and so on. To compound the confusion, the Germans felt that 'spirit' was a word which did not translate well into their language and would put off people who would otherwise be drawn to our politics. [An Italian participant] pointed out that to talk of a 'crisis of the human spirit' was to sound like he Pope's weekly pronouncements from the Vatican! Yet others were voting on linguistic/literary grounds rather than on a political basis. The whole discussion ran out of time and was not very productive" (M. Small to Social Ecology Project, c. early

Sept. 1994). No mention is made of any acceptance of the whole statement by "majority vote."

Clark/Cafard goes on to say that this statement was "consigned to the social ecological memory hole by the trusty editors of the International"--that is, it was omitted from Small's conference report in *Social Ecology International* newsletter. Actually, apart from our substantive objections to its content, we opposed the publication of the statement of principles for a very important reason: A gathering--to which "all" were "welcome" and in which many non-social ecologists participated--simply did not have the legitimacy to produce a statement of principles of social ecology. The group that met in Dunoon was not a conference of committed social ecologists, delegated from groups of social ecologists in their home areas; it was not even a conference that had been organized around a preexisting statement of principles. Rather, admission to the gathering was open to "all." As such, its purpose should have been limited to education and networking. Least of all should non-social ecologists have sat on a committee to draft a statement of principles of social ecology.

For this reason the Social Ecology Project (in Burlington)--along with several others involved with the gathering--wrote to the newsletter's editors: "We believe that the draft principles statement that this committee produced should be discarded. Although it contains some useful formulations, it is clearly undesirable as a statement of social ecology. Instead of drawing clear boundaries between social ecology and other environmental tendencies, it blurs those boundaries repeatedly. But it is problematic not only in terms of content but in terms of process. At least one non-social ecologist was present on the committee and was heavily involved in its drafting. Further, there is some question as to the legitimacy of issuing a statement at all, given that the distinction between delegate conference/educational gathering was blurred. (...We [previously] argued that the gathering should be organized around pre-gathering statements of principle of social ecology as bases for *discussion* and opposed the idea that it should issue a statement.)." Finally, we argued, "since it was not approved, why should it be published at all?" (Social Ecology Project to M. Small, Sept. 13, 1995).

We were merely expressing our view, as we had every right to do, and we had no reason to think that it would be decisive, especially since the gathering organizers had previously demonstrated quite clearly that they think very independently of us. In this case the editors had told us that they intended to publish the statement, and we therefore fully expected to see it in the next issue of the newsletter, and we intended to write a "commentary" for a subsequent issue (Social Ecology Project to T. Fotopoulos, Sept. 2, 1995).

In the end the editors of the newsletter decided against publishing the draft principles. To this day I do not know their exact reasons, but I do believe that they had good cause to make that decision. Small wrote (in a letter) just after the conference that "here lies the problem of Toward--we had the ridiculous situation where people who know little or nothing about social ecology, or were specifically involved in different politics, were

voting on an important document for social ecology" (M. Small to T. Fotopoulos, Aug. 23, 1995). To publish the document in the _Social Ecology International_ newsletter would have been to elevate as principles of "social ecology" a statement from which antistatism, revolution, and libertarian communism were absent, and in which libertarian municipalism was not even mentioned.

After the Conference

After the conference, says Clark/Cafard, Bookchin wrote "a lengthy diatribe ... excommunicating 'C' from the fold of Social Ecology." But those who examine "Comments on the International Social Ecology Gathering and the 'Deep Social Ecology of John Clark" will see that no "excommunication" took place. What took place is a criticism of someone whose outlook has moved increasingly far away from face-to-face democracy, revolutionism, antistatism, and libertarian communism. Clark's ideas were and are not "social ecology" in any form that is familiar or agreeable to us, or to those who expect it to have something to do with libertarian municipalism, social revolution, antistatism, and libertarian communism, let alone secularism. If he cannot tell the difference between critique and "excommunication," then he is greatly handicapped in his ability to participate in debates.

Clark/Cafard goes on to recount the subsequent events: "Next, 'C' was purged from the International Advisory Board of the journal Democracy and Nature." Clark was indeed dropped from the advisory board of this journal, in a decision that was made by the International Editorial Board. It is not surprising that the IEB made this decision, since some of the editors had arrived independently at many of the same difficulties that we were having about Clark's approach. It may be difficult for Clark to grasp this fact, but let me state it very simply: _The D&N editors developed these concerns of their own accord, independently of us, using their own minds. We did not brainwash them or subject them to any "confessions." It is possible for people to be critical of John Clark's views on the basis of their content, without being "dogmatically" coerced by us._

Clark/Cafard complains in _Anarchy_ that the editors of D&N "not only reprinted Bookchin's diatribe but ... continually refus[ed] to publish the critique itself." D&N did reprint Bookchin's article, as I mentioned, in vol. 3, no. 3, issue 9 (1997), pp. 154ff, where it is available for all who are interested to see. But the statement that D&N "refused" to publish Clark's piece is outrageously false. The D&N editors in fact would have much preferred to published Clark's "Beyond the Limits of the City" in conjunction with Bookchin's reply. But according to the editor who spoke to us, Clark himself simply refused to give D&N his permission--not the other way around, as Clark would have it now! In the absence of Clark's permission, which the D&N editors much regretted, they published Bookchin's article accompanied by an "editor's note," which read: "Unfortunately, we are not able to also publish John Clark's talk since the author has not allowed it to be reprinted" (p. 154). And this is supposed to be an example of the "Bookchin-Biehl faction" "excluding" Clark from a publication? Clark excluded himself--and only then accused us of excluding him!

The Lisbon Conference: "The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism"

Another instance of our supposed "dogmatism" that Clark cites is the recent conference "The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism," held in Lisbon in late August 1998. About this event Clark complains: "The group chose to exclude me from the recent Lisbon conference on 'the politics of social ecology' on the grounds that I do not adhere to Bookchin and Biehl's orthodoxy. Significantly, I was excluded by the 'Burlington Organizing Committee,' and duly informed of the action in a letter from Janet Biehl herself, while the Lisbon organizers knew nothing about this exclusion policy, and Europeans who have much less in common with Bookchin and Biehl than I do were welcomed to the conference."

I must first emphasize that Murray Bookchin had nothing to do with organizing this conference, let alone with the incident mentioned here. If anything, although he supported the conference and hoped that it would be successful, he was privately concerned that it was premature: that many of the participants would not be knowledgeable about libertarian municipalism, and that they would be uncertain about the conference's aims. In any case, for reasons of age and infirmity, and out of a desire to let younger people take over, he early on made a decision not to get involved with organizing the conference. I was and still am a member of the Montreal/Vermont International Organizing Committee; Bookchin never was.

Second, everyone who worked on the conference--both on the Montreal/Vermont IOC and on the Lisbon IOC--knew that the conference policy was to screen potential participants and to limit admission to those with a degree of sympathy with or commitment to libertarian municipalism. We had learned well the lesson of Dunoon, whose "all welcome" policy had made a working conference impossible. For the Lisbon conference, we sought to determine how much knowledge and commitment potential participants had for libertarian municipalism by asking them to respond to a simple questionnaire.

In late June 1998, when John Clark applied to participate, he was sent the questionnaire. He filled it out and referred us to his article "Municipal Dreams." This article is in fact a revised version of "Beyond the Limits of the City," the draft that he had presented at Dunoon; it replies to some of Bookchin's minor arguments and ignores his major points, but it is still a very sharp attack on libertarian municipalism. Based on this article, the Montreal/Vermont IOC agreed that Clark should not be admitted to the conference, and we sent him the following letter:

"To John Clark:

"Thank you for your interest in the upcoming conference 'The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism,' and for your response to our questionnaire.

"As the International Call states, the conference is organized around the ideas of libertarian municipalism, as developed and articulated by Murray Bookchin and summarized by Janet Biehl in her book, *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism.* The purpose of the conference is not to debate the fundamentals of libertarian municipalism, or to assess its validity as an approach to creating an ecological society. Such debates and assessments have taken place and will continue to take place in various venues in the print and electronic media.

"Rather, this conference presupposes, as stated in the Call, that the participants are 'interested to discuss and advance the politics of social ecology: libertarian municipalism' and are ready to constructively advance these ideas in theory and practice.

"Further, as is stated in the cover letter that accompanied the questionnaire that you received: 'The purpose of this conference is to provide a venue where those who share a degree of commitment to libertarian municipalism may discuss it and examine ways to advance it in practical terms, in order to build a libertarian municipalist movement. Those who participate in the conference should therefore share a common understanding of libertarian municipalism as the politics of social ecology and a general sympathy with or support for its tenets and practices.'

"Based on your reply to the questionnaire and other recent writings, we find that your work does not meet these criteria. Although you state that you are 'interested in libertarian and communitarian municipal politics' (an ambiguously worded formulation), we take the article to which you have referred us, 'Municipal Dreams,' as the full exposition of your attitude toward libertarian municipalism. 'Municipal Dreams' is, in fact, intensely hostile toward these ideas. In the very first paragraph you straightforwardly state that your intention is to 'counterpose' 'eco-communitarian politics' to 'Bookchin's libertarian municipalism.' The article goes on to take issue, quite agonistically, with almost every aspect of the libertarian municipalism of Murray Bookchin. In no sense can we construe this article as reflecting support for it.

"We therefore reject your proposal to present your paper at the Lisbon conference or to participate in either the Lisbon or Vermont conference in any capacity.

"Sincerely,
"Janet Biehl and Gary Sisco for the International Organizing
"Committee--Montreal/Vermont"

This rejection letter reflects neither sectarianism nor dogmatism. On the contrary, it reflects a principled and consistent concern to create a particular kind of conference--one to advance libertarian municipalism. Clark--a well-known opponent of libertarian municipalism, as well as of revolution, libertarian communism, face-to-face democracy, and perhaps even antistatism--could hardly have contributed constructively to that project. If it is "dogmatic" and "sectarian" to exclude from a conference someone whose position

is intensely hostile to the subject of the conference, then I despair that any conference that seeks to organize around a set of ideas will ever get off the ground.

"I might give a number examples of such behavior," Clark alleges in his RA message, referring to these incidents of our alleged "dogmatism" and "sectarianism." If he indeed has more "examples," then he should put them on the table, so that we may address them fairly and justly. If none are forthcoming, we may regard this statement as mere bluster.

In the future social ecologists/libertarian municipalists will continue to hold conferences and will continue to publish books and articles. Doubtless, no matter how well or poorly they behave, Clark will once again accuse us of "dogmatism" and "sectarianism," and he will once again cast himself as the victim of our alleged authoritarianism. But readers of this account should be aware that Clark's modus operandi is to find ways to portray us as tyrants and himself as our victim, regardless of the facts of a given matter.

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